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Abstract
The free energy principle describes cognitive functions such
as perception, action, learning and attention in terms of sur-
prisal minimisation. Under simplifying assumptions, agents
are depicted as systems minimising a weighted sum of pre-
diction errors encoding the mismatch between incoming sen-
sations and an agent’s predictions about such sensations. The
“dark room” is defined as a state that an agent would occupy
should it only look to minimise this sum of prediction errors.
This (paradoxical) state emerges as the contrast between the
attempts to describe the richness of human and animal be-
haviour in terms of surprisal minimisation and the trivial so-
lution of a dark room, where the complete lack of sensory
stimuli would provide the easiest way to minimise prediction
errors, i.e., to be in a perfectly predictable state of darkness
with no incoming stimuli. Using a process theory derived
from the free energy principle, active inference, we investi-
gate with an agent-based model the meaning of the dark room
problem and discuss some of its implications for natural and
artificial systems. In this set up, we propose that the presence
of this paradox is primarily due to the long-standing belief
that agents should encode accurate world models, typical of
traditional (computational) theories of cognition.
Introduction
The free energy principle (FEP) and predictive process-
ing (PP) are popular frameworks in the cognitive sciences
that advocate the use of probabilistic generative models to
describe brain processes including perception, action and
higher order cognitive functions (Dayan et al., 1995; Rao
and Ballard, 1999; Knill and Pouget, 2004; Friston et al.,
2006; Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2015b; Bogacz, 2017; Buck-
ley et al., 2017). In these frameworks, perception is de-
scribed as a process of inferring the most likely hidden prop-
erties of sensory data by minimising the error between ac-
tual sensations and those predicted by a probabilistic gen-
erative model (Dayan et al., 1995; Rao and Ballard, 1999;
Knill and Pouget, 2004). Active inference, a process the-
ory derived from the free energy principle, introduces also
a formal description of action as a way for agents to change
their sensory input to better fit their predictions. Agents thus
actively interact with the environment to produce sensations
that generative models can predict. On this view, behaviour
is generated through interactions with the world defined in
terms that are consistent with the perceptual accounts of
FEP/PP. Motor commands are expressed as predictions in-
stantiated by the same generative model at a proprioceptive
level compared with actual proprioceptive input (Friston,
2011; Adams et al., 2013). These two processes, inferring
properties of the world and inferring actions needed to meet
expectations, close the sensorimotor loop and suggest a deep
symmetry between action and perception.
The “dark room problem” (Friston et al., 2012) is pre-
sented in the context of an agent whose only goal is to reduce
prediction error. Such agent, it is argued, should find the
simplest and most predictable state where prediction error
can be minimised, i.e., a dark room with no sensory input.
This state, however, fails to account for the complexity of the
behaviour that the FEP and PP frameworks claim to account
for. Here we propose that this paradox arises mostly from
the use of “perception centric” views of PP and active infer-
ence theories, with agents seen as simply building generative
models of their sensory observations capturing the complex-
ity of the environment. This perception centric view can be
seen in analogy to, we claim, traditional sense-model-plan-
act architectures (as described by Brooks (1991)), emphasis-
ing the role played by detailed and precise world models.
In this work we introduce a minimal model of perception
centric agents, showing a simple implementation of agents
seeking (and finding) “dark rooms”. We will argue that,
from the Bayesian perspective proposed in active inference,
this is due to the lack of priors that can affect the behaviour
of our agents (cf. Baltieri and Buckley (2017, 2019)), with
actions entirely driven by external stimuli.
Perception centric PP and the dark room
problem
In perception centric approaches to PP, agents can be de-
scribed as “perception machines” whose job is to capture,
encode and possibly predict the richness of their environ-
ment, becoming mirrors of their milieu (Huang and Rao,
2011; Spratling, 2016). This creates, we claim, a GOFAI-
like reasoning system that allows an agent to simulate so-
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phisticated cognitive tasks using an internal (generative)
model that, essentially, mirrors the world (see for instance
Ha and Schmidhuber (2018) for a recent example of these
generative models in machine learning). The only true nov-
elty introduced by PP interpretations is the explicit use of
top-down information flows, inspired by predictive coding
accounts of cortical activity (Rao and Ballard, 1999). On
this view, PP is depicted as a scheme for the construction
of accurate and meticulous world models that serve higher
purposes such as planning, attention and decision-making.
Action is vicariously implemented based on powerful and
accurate models of an agent’s milieu that can be seen as al-
most detached from the world itself (Hohwy, 2013). The
external environment is essentially only “used” during the
initial construction of internal models, implicitly assuming
that it is possible to encode all of the properties needed for
planning and that such properties will not change over time.
If the goal of an agent is to to minimise the surprisal or,
under certain assumptions, a weighted sum of prediction er-
rors of its sensations (Buckley et al., 2017), what is the role
of action in implementations of PP and active inference? An
agent that builds models of the world by inferring proper-
ties that objectively reflect its incoming sensations should, if
prediction error minimisation is its only purpose, also only
act to minimise such prediction errors.
In this light, the “dark room problem” (Friston et al.,
2012; Sims, 2017; Klein, 2018) describes the case where the
best way for an active inference agent to minimise its sen-
sory surprisal is to simply act in order to generate a trivial
and easily predictable sensory input stream, cf. the oriental
Nirvana analogy (Mumford, 1992). In this thought experi-
ment, an agent can access a so-called “dark room”, a place or
a state in the world with no sensory stimuli. It is thus argued
that an active inference agent simply looking to minimise
its sensory surprisal is bound to go to such room, formu-
late trivial hypotheses on the lack of sensory input and never
move again, indefinitely. Staying in a dark room becomes
the best outcome for this agent since the lack of sensations
is explained away by trivial predictions, giving thus a predic-
tion error which is constantly zero. This example represents
a valuable theoretical construct for the discussion of active
inference agents in the context of sensorimotor loops, but as
already suggested in Friston et al. (2012) it can never be the
case for biological systems. Appealing to classical ideas of
homeostasis tracing back to, at least, the good regulator the-
orem (Conant and Ashby, 1970), only agents whose purpose
is to exist while having no realistic physiological constraints
could find themselves preferring a dark-room-like situation.
The living creatures we know of, on the other hand, show
different needs that must be satisfied over time, including for
example the maintenance of a certain body temperature and
several other variables within boundaries (e.g. glucose, cal-
cium and oxygen levels). The variables ensuring an agent’s
survival are proposed to be encoded within an agent through
evolution, and used in a set of homeostatic mechanisms that
regulate different processes (cf. the “essential variables” in
Ashby (1957)) of a system (Seth, 2014). In active infer-
ence, these different drives are represented by priors and
are crucial for the role they play in top-down predictions
of the world. When these predictions are not matched by
the sensory input, errors at the sensory level are generated
and propagated in a bottom-up fashion to trigger processes
of prediction update and action selection. The balance of
top-down and bottom-up flows is modulated by precisions
(inverse (co)variances), a set of weights for prediction errors
that modulate their strength.
To discuss the role of both priors and precisions in the
context of sensorimotor loops, in this work we present some
initial results from computational simulations of active in-
ference agents performing basic homeostatic control. By
focusing on a minimal model of a “Bayesian cruise con-
troller”, similar in spirit to the “Bayesian thermostat” exam-
ple found in Buckley et al. (2017), we emphasise the role of
perception and action in perception centric active inference
agents leading to the dark room puzzle.
A Bayesian cruise controller
In this model, a block of mass = 1 kg (our agent) is placed on
a surface with some sliding friction. The goal of this agent
is to regulate its velocity, which can be perceived through
a sensor, towards a desired set-point vdes (vdes = 10 km/h
unless otherwise stated). The regulation will be described
as a Bayesian inference process, inspired by the free energy
principle and implemented in an active inference set up. The
details behind the mechanism for velocity regulation will not
be specified, since they don’t add any more insight to our
proof of concept. We will simply assume that this agent can
apply a force that moves the block against the effects of fric-
tion which tend to bring the velocity of the block down to
zero. The generative process, describing the dynamics of
the world for our agent, will simply entail the definition of a
velocity variable x (here to be interpreted as hidden state
rather than as a position/displacement) that exponentially
decays over time with a constant rate α due to the effects
of friction. We also describe these dynamics as noisy, with a
random variablew ∼ N (0, σ2w), and have an action variable
a that represents the force applied by the agent as an input
(in states-space formulations terms) to achieve homeostatic
control. The generative process is presented in the form of
a state-space model as in most implementations of active in-
ference, e.g., Friston (2008); Buckley et al. (2017); Bogacz
(2017); Baltieri and Buckley (2019):
x′ = −αx+ a+ w (1)
To simplify the example, no other exogenous inputs (in
a state-space representation sense) are added, cf. Baltieri
and Buckley (2019) where we also considered forces such
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Figure 1: The agent, a Bayesian cruise controller. A block
of mass = 1 kg, i.e. the agent, is placed on a surface with dy-
namic friction. The goal of the agent is to reach and maintain
a velocity vdes.
as wind. To maintain (mathematical) consistency with pre-
vious formulations we represent the generative process us-
ing a Langevin form where w is weakly autocorrelated in
a Stratonovich sense, i.e., not a Wiener process, even if
the noise variables are implemented as white noise in our
code for simplicity1, see Friston (2008); Baltieri and Buck-
ley (2019) for discussion. The velocity and accelerations
measurements y, y′ are given as noisy readings of x, x′ with
observation noise z ∼ N (0, σ2z), z′ ∼ N (0, σ2z′):
y = x+ z y′ = x′ + z′ (2)
The next step requires the definition of the agent’s genera-
tive model (Buckley et al., 2017; Bogacz, 2017), including a
model of the system’s dynamics:
x′ =− αx+ vdes + w (3)
and of measurements:
y = x+ z y′ = x′ + z′ (4)
One of the major assumptions made in active inference is
that the action variable a cannot be observed directly by an
agent (i.e., it’s not part of its generative model) and not nec-
essary for problems of control (Friston et al., 2010; Friston,
2011), giving rise to a different way of implementing regula-
tion (Baltieri and Buckley, 2018a, 2019). In active inference,
one thus assumes that an agent is endowed with a minimal
mapping encoding how actions a modify observations y, y′
(rather than hidden states x, x′) via reflex arcs, as discussed
in Friston et al. (2010); Friston (2011). In this case we also
use, again for consistency, the notation in generalised coor-
dinates of motion defined in Friston (2008); Buckley et al.
(2017) for random variables z, z′. Under Gaussian assump-
tions for z, z′ andw, one can write the above state-space rep-
1https://github.com/mbaltieri/BayesianCruiseController
resentation of the generative model in a probabilistic form:
p(y|x) = N (x, σ2z)
p(y′|x′) = N (x′, σ2z′)
p(x′|x, v;α) = N (−αx+ vdes, σ2w) (5)
and considering the Laplace-encoded variational free energy
defined in equation (12) in Baltieri and Buckley (2019), here
reported as
F ≈ − ln p(ψ˜, x˜, v˜; θ, γ)∣∣
ϑ˜=µ˜
(6)
one can see that the probabilistic description of the gener-
ative model presented here reflects the likelihood and prior
distributions necessary to build the generative density for the
definition of the free energy (Buckley et al., 2017). The gen-
erative density in equation (6) can be decomposed into
p(ψ˜, x˜, v˜; θ, γ) = p(ψ˜|x˜, v˜; θ, γ)p(x˜, v˜; θ, γ) (7)
and after specifying ψ˜ = {y, y′}, x˜ = {x, x′}, v˜ = {vdes},
θ = α and hyperparameters γ encoding properties about
precisions piz, piz′ , piw, one gets
p(ψ˜|x˜, v˜; θ, γ) = {p(y|x), p(y′|x′)} (8)
p(x˜, v˜; θ, γ) = p(x′|x, v;α) (9)
The free energy then becomes:
F (y, µ˜x, µv) ≈1
2
[
piz(y − µx)2 + piz′(y′ − µ′x)2
+piw(µ
′
x + αµx − µv)2 − ln(pizpiz′piw)
]
(10)
with perception ˙˜µx = Dµ˜x − ∂F/∂µ˜x, following Friston





[− piz(y − µx) + piwα(µ′x + αµx − µv)] =
=µ′x +
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x + αµx − µv)
]
=
=− piw(µ′x + αµx − µv) (11)
and action, a˙ = −∂F/∂a (Friston et al., 2010; Buckley
et al., 2017), as:
a˙ = −[piz(y − µx)∂y/∂a+ piz′(y′ − µ′x)∂y′/∂a]
= −[piz′(y′ − µx′)] (12)
where we use the fact that an implicit model in terms of
reflex arcs (Friston, 2011) is embodied by the agent via
∂y′/∂a = 1, ∂y/∂a = 0 (13)
These equations, when combined, form an action-perception
loop with information inferred from the environment
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through perception and control exerted on the world via ac-
tion. The combination of action and perception is regu-
lated by precision parameters “pi”, representing weights in
the weighted sum of prediction errors, see equation (10).
Precisions encode the uncertainty (they are in fact inverse
(co)variances) of different variables of a generative model
in an agent and effectively regulate the minimisation of vari-
ational free energy in equation (11) and equation (12). For
the remainder of this work we will specify (weighted) sen-
sory prediction errors as the errors weighted by sensory pre-
cisions piz or more in general piz˜ and process or (weighted)
system prediction errors as the ones weighted by process
or system precisions piw or piw˜ if dealing with generalised
coordinates of motion (Friston, 2008; Buckley et al., 2017;
Baltieri and Buckley, 2019). This distinction will be useful
when we emphasise the role of precision weights on the min-
imisation of variational free energy, producing behaviours
influenced by their relative strength.
More in general, precision parameters in a generative
model can be unrelated to the actual precisions of the true
hidden states, causes and observations of a generative pro-
cess (i.e. the world dynamics), and in some cases this mis-
alignment is claimed to be necessary for behaviour (Feld-
man and Friston, 2010; Wiese, 2016). Precisions have also
been addressed also in terms of “confidences”, thought to
encode how confident an agent is about its estimates of hid-
den variables. Precisions pi’s are in the most general case
dynamic parameters that can change over time allowing for
several types of behaviours to emerge depending on differ-
ent situations and needs of an agent, see for example Feld-
man and Friston (2010). In this work we assume fixed-
valued precisions in order to focus on cases of “precision
engineering” (Clark, 2015b) showing their role in the emer-
gence of different behaviours as in, for instance, Baltieri and
Buckley (2017). More specifically, we focus on “percep-
tion centric” (or passive) agents within the context of ac-
tive inference, agents that heavily rely on perceptual infer-
ence, (over)focusing on estimating hidden properties of their
sensory input. This perception centric view will be imple-
mented with agents whose sensory prediction errors dom-
inate system prediction errors, emphasising the bottom-up
nature of incoming signals, as described in standard models
of predictive processing models for perception Huang and
Rao (2011); Spratling (2016). We will also consider the im-
portance of a closed sensorimotor loop, initially focusing on
agents that can only perceive their environment without act-
ing, and then introducing the ability for agents to affect the
world, once again in a perception centric view of PP.
Just observing, the passive tracker
Passive trackers are agents that can only perceive their world
without the ability to modify any of its properties. They are
an extreme version of the archetypical case advocated by
“perception centric” PP (Huang and Rao, 2011; Spratling,
Table 1: Agents’ parameters and setups. The table sum-
marises the parameters used to simulate our two agents, the
passive tracker and the active tracker, following the imple-
mentation of equation (11) and equation (12).
piz piz′ piw Action
Passive
tracker
exp(1) exp(1) exp(−12) a = a˙ = 0
Active
tracker
exp(1) exp(1) exp(−12) a˙ = ∂F/∂a
2016), already prioritising the estimation of the causes of
observed sensations over adaptive behaviour. Passive track-
ers over-prioritise perception over action and in fact are im-
plemented following equation (11) for perception, while ac-
tions a in equation (12) are not included, i.e., a = a˙ = 0.
They also heavily rely on bottom-up observations over top-
down priors, with weighted sensory prediction errors tak-
ing a dominant role and driving predictions about incom-
ing data. The larger the ratio between sensory and system
prediction errors, the smaller is the role played by prior be-
liefs. As we can see in Fig. 2, in the simplest case, suitable
(although small) priors filter out some of the measurement
noise, separating the signal to be inferred (the black line)
from the noise due to sensors/receptors. Without action, this
agent cannot control its velocity and reach the target veloc-
ity (vdes = 10 km/h), naturally slowing down and eventually
stopping following its autonomous dynamics.





















Figure 2: (The passive tracker) The velocity of the block.
The velocity perceived by the agent (blue line), its best es-
timate according to weak priors (red) and the block’s true
velocity, i.e. without measurement noise (black).
In Fig. 3 we can see that the variational free energy of our
agent is (on average) minimised over time (Fig. 3c), driven
mainly by the weighted prediction errors on sensory input.
Weighted sensory prediction errors vary in the order of 101
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Figure 3: (The passive tracker) Weighted prediction er-
rors and variational free energy. The evolution of (A)
sensory prediction errors on velocity, (B) system prediction
error and (C) variational free energy.
(Fig. 3a and similarly for the acceleration, not reported),
while the system error is in the order of 10−5 (Fig. 3b).
Acting with no reason, the active tracker
Active trackers are agents that can actively interact with
their environment and unlike their passive version, they
integrate action via equation (12) to close the sensorimo-
tor loop together with perception, implemented by equa-
tion (11). However they are just another (although more
elaborate) example of the perception centric description
introduced by Clark (2015a,b), a direct consequence of
Bayesian brain/predictive coding schemes (Rao and Ballard,
1999; Huang and Rao, 2011; Spratling, 2016) endowed with
simple mechanisms for active behaviour and motor control.
These agents can impact their environment through motor
actions but they only do so to better sample sensations in
agreement with their existing predictions, producing a “kind
of self-fulfilling prophecy” (Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2015a) en-
tirely driven by incoming sensory input. Active trackers
don’t use (possibly relevant) priors to estimate their sensa-
tions and, as in the case of the passive tracker, are completely
enslaved by their observations in a state of pure information
gathering. Actions are only produced to cancel sensory pre-
diction errors, to generate more accurate predictions about
the world. Effectively, this creates the “dark room problem”
for active agents exposed in Friston et al. (2012), i.e., agents
that “predict”, or rather account for, all their observations,
with action simply bound to produce a process of inconclu-
sive behaviour (unless the purpose for a system is to just esti-
mate the hidden properties of its observations, unlike ours!).





















Figure 4: (The active tracker) The velocity of the block.
The velocity perceived by the agent (blue line), its best es-
timate according to weak priors (red) and the block’s true
velocity, i.e. without measurement noise (black).
The estimate of velocity, Fig. 4, becomes a good descrip-
tion of the real variable in the world as in the case of the
passive tracker. In the passive tracker example, however, the
block naturally slowed down and eventually stopped (nearly
stopped, because of the presence of environmental noise)
close to the origin. In the active version of the tracker, the
initial sensory prediction error given by the estimate µx ini-
tialised at 0 triggers an action (see Fig. 5) which will then
be constant over time after the prediction error on velocity is
minimised, i.e. when the agent can predict its velocity. Hav-
ing no other drive but to accurately predict its observations,
this agent maintains its motor action constant since it has
no associated cost. Random initialisations of µx give dif-
ferent set-point equilibria to the system, providing different,
but still accurate, estimates of the block’s motion after ac-
tions bring it into a predictable state more quickly. Similarly
to the passive tracker, the agent cannot control its behaviour
towards the target velocity, but due to the presence of ac-
tions a affecting the environment, it now follows the non-
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autonomous dynamics driven by its own actions, generating
observations more easily predictable from its perspective.


















Figure 5: (The active tracker) The motor action of the
agent. The action induced by the minimisation of varia-
tional free energy following active inference given, in this
case, a weak prior.
As in the case of the passive tracker, (weighted) sensory
prediction errors (Fig. 6a for velocity and the one on accel-
eration, not reported) exert a much larger influence on the
minimisation of variational free energy (Fig. 6c) due to the
precision weighting mechanism enforcing their role. The
only significant difference between the active and the pas-
sive versions is on the process prediction error, cf. Fig. 6b
and Fig. 3b, given by the fact that the active tracker gets fur-
ther away from the “desired” state represented by the prior
thanks to its motor actions, while still fulfilling its only goal
of better predicting its incoming sensations.
Discussion
In theories derived from the Bayesian brain hypothesis
(Knill and Pouget, 2004) and predictive processing (Ho-
hwy, 2013; Clark, 2015b), there is often a strong emphasis
on perceptual processes. This is both due to historical rea-
sons that trace these ideas back to work by Helmholtz and
related theories of analysis by synthesis (Von Helmholtz,
1867; Neisser, 1967; Gregory, 1970), and to a strong tra-
dition in the cognitive sciences to focus on perception and
cognition over action and behaviour (Fodor, 1983; Boden,
2006). The repercussions of this bias in Bayesian theories of
the mind are deep and rooted, constantly re-emerging even
in the most modern proposals on the Bayesian brain. Fol-
lowing the definition given by Clark (2015a,b), we strongly
advocate for a formal distinction between “perception cen-
tric” and “action-oriented” Bayesian approaches to cogni-
tive science (see also Engel et al. (2016)), with implications
potentially capturing aspects of the more general discussion
between traditional and 4E approaches to cognitive science.
In this work we provided a minimal model of a sensori-
motor loop built using active inference and aimed at show-
ing, with an example of homeostatic regulation, some of
the possible misunderstandings of the FEP and related the-
ories. Here we focused on an initial account of the “dark
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Figure 6: (The active tracker)Weighted prediction errors
and variational free energy. The evolution of (A) sensory
prediction errors on velocity, (B) system prediction error and
(C) variational free energy.
room problem” proposed in Friston et al. (2012) following
arguments introduced in Mumford (1992). This problem de-
scribes the contrast between the rich repertoire of behaviours
of real living creatures and the simple mandate of an agent
looking to only minimise the surprisal of its sensations as
advocated by PP and FEP. In particular, agents minimis-
ing their surprisal should, it is claimed, find an easily pre-
dictable state and cease to receive any new input, minimis-
ing their prediction errors while avoiding new sensations,
i.e., a dark room. It was our goal to make the example espe-
cially simple, and for this reason the problem of regulation
was reduced to a (Bayesian) cruise controller for an agent
(i.e. a block) sliding on a surface with dynamic friction. The
friction naturally slows the block down, but the agent is en-
dowed with the ability to apply a force over time that allows
the block to move and maintain a desired speed. With this
example we then explored two cases representing an open
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and closed action-perception loop in active inference. The
weaknesses of stories without motor actions became soon
obvious, but it was nonetheless important to establish the
background over which this work is based (see also Bru-
ineberg et al. (2018), where this point is explored in depth).
Alongside the absence or presence of action to define an
appropriate sensorimotor loop, we also began investigating
the balance of prediction errors. As we can see in equa-
tion (10), the expression for the variational free energy un-
der the Laplace approximation is reduced almost entirely to
a weighted sum of prediction errors. These errors can be di-
vided into (weighted) sensory and (weighted) process or sys-
tem prediction errors, the former encoding mismatches be-
tween the current best estimates of sensory data and bottom-
up (true) sensory data, the latter representing the differences
between top-down prior information and the current best es-
timate of the hidden variables of a system. All these pre-
diction errors are weighted by precision hyperparameters,
the inverse (co)variance of observations and hidden dynam-
ics of a system. As stressed in previous work (Baltieri and
Buckley, 2017, 2019), these hyperparameters need not en-
code true properties of the world and can instead be seen as
quantifying the uncertainty, or confidence, of an agent’s esti-
mates. Considering that precisions are, in principle, defined
over a continuous interval of values, we simplified our initial
analysis by imposing high sensory precisions, piz˜ = exp(1)
and low system precisions, piw˜ = exp(−12). Higher pre-
cisions drive the minimisation of free energy, enforcing the
relative strength of one subset of hyperparameters and rel-
ative prediction errors over the other, see equation (11) and
(12) (and results in Baltieri and Buckley (2017, 2019)).
We initially studied the passive tracker, representing an
extreme version of (almost) purely bottom-up driven percep-
tual processing. The passive tracker passively engages with
new observations, attempting to estimate new observations.
The complete lack of prior information however, forces this
agent to rely entirely on new observations and so, at best,
to track the incoming sensations over time after they have
been observed. For this agent, every sensation is essentially
“surprising” (in statistical terms) since priors play little to
no role in making predictions about incoming data. Sensory
prediction errors have a much greater amplitude and are thus
driving the minimisation of variational free energy. These
agents present in a straightforward way some of the argu-
ments advocated by ideas of analysis by synthesis and the
Bayesian brain hypothesis (Knill and Pouget, 2004; Yuille
and Kersten, 2006), in particular the necessity of top-down
information in the form of priors to disambiguate observa-
tions, whose estimates are otherwise entirely enslaved by
bottom-up signals. In our example, while top-down infor-
mation is available to the agent, it is completely overshad-
owed by the presence of large weighted sensory prediction
errors that drive the minimisation of variational free energy.
In this set up, homeostatic regulation requires both a per-
ceptual process of estimation of the world (i.e. the agent’s
velocity) and an action selection procedure that allows, at
least in principle, an agent to fulfil its “desires”, i.e. targets
encoded in the form of a prior. The agent we investigated
however, the active tracker, follows the same fate of the pas-
sive one, bound to simply attempt to account for its observa-
tions. In the active tracker, action simply enacts behaviour
that generates more predictable sensory input, in analogy to
the dark room problem (Friston et al., 2012). An agent with
no strong priors and whose only purpose is thus to predict its
sensations should look for a state where sensations are triv-
ially predicted, i.e. a dark room. Considering the block in
our set up, the closest state to a “dark room” is any equilib-
rium of the system reached when action is stationary, since
acting is modelled without any associated cost. This agent
simply finds the best way to predict its state by bending the
world to its predictions and generating predictions that better
conform to its sensations.
It has been argued that the presence of strong top-down
prior information that misrepresent the incoming sensations
can generate actions that compensate for sensory prediction
errors generated by the misalignment of top-down priors and
bottom-up sensations, allowing an agent to fulfil its goals
(Wiese, 2016). On this “action oriented” view of PP and
active inference (Engel et al., 2016; Clark, 2015b), genera-
tive models do not encode veridical information of incom-
ing sensations but on the contrary, describe the desires of
an agent with the very purpose of creating mismatch errors
that only active behaviour can minimise. The two example
agents presented in this work, the “passive tracker” and the
“active tracker”, invoke a more traditional notion of gener-
ative model as a stand-in for the environment, providing an
accurate and objective characterisation of the world an agent
traverses. This outlines the connections between “percep-
tion centric” descriptions of PP (Huang and Rao, 2011; Ho-
hwy, 2013; Spratling, 2016) and traditional, computational
accounts of the mind (Newell et al., 1972; Fodor, 1983)
where the necessity of accurate world models is a central
tenet of cognitive processes. On the other hand, the pres-
ence of strong priors may denote a more “action oriented”
perspective of PP and active inference, one where precise
models of the world are not only unnecessary but fundamen-
tally detrimental (Clark, 2015a; Wiese, 2016), as seen in our
simulations where the agent never reached the desired speed.
Agents emphasising the role of priors can (potentially) better
represent the need for ideas inspired by 4E (embodied, enac-
tive, embedded and extended) theories in PP, while still ad-
vocating for generative models of approximate understand-
ings of the world (Baltieri and Buckley, 2018b) and senso-
rimotor contingencies and coupled agent-environment sys-
tems (Baltieri and Buckley, 2017). The in-depth exploration
of an action oriented version of our Bayesian cruise con-
troller with a more central role for priors implemented using
different precision weights is, however, left for future work.
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